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Media Power and Nigeria's Consolidating Democracy 
 





In emerging democracies with weak public institutions, low literacy level, deep-seated 
ethnic rivalry, and history of centralized, authoritarian rule; to what extent does media 
agenda-setting influence the political process? The press/politics nexus in consolidating 
democracies is critical to understanding intricate yet overlapping connexion between 
politics and development in the Third World. This study examined if media-power shape 
elections and regime outcomes in Nigeria? Using semi-structured interviews (and 
incorporating News-Game research tool), findings indicate that Nigeria's two-decade-old 
democracy remains volatile, fragile, and vulnerable. This vulnerability is complicated by 
long-standing religious, ethno-regional political suspicions; and overburdened with 
shifting media ecology, particularly social media disinformation and propaganda. These 
complexities allow a politics of privilege, class, and power that not only ensures its 
preservation but also insulates the political elite from public outcry and media pressure. 
In conclusion, evidence indicates that media power exerts limited influence on elections 
and regime outcomes. The study recommends renewed effort to investigate power. 
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In Western democracies, free flow of news and information made available by an 





a means to specific ends- social equality, political representation and development. This 
is underpinned by the assumption that democracy depends on media influence- one that 
promotes boundless political, social and economic debates and reports the actions of 
political leaders to the electorate. “Press freedom is not only an indispensable pillar of 
democracy, but also important for the long-term sustainability of social and economic 
development (Senghore, 2012, 1). The liberal press therefore exerts power and political 
influence through their ability to reach broad audiences with news and information that 
shapes public life. An independent press performs informative roles, ensures plurality in 
the public sphere and more importantly, weave together different threads of a 
multicultural, multiparty society and connect members of that community ideologically 
and politically; thereby fostering popular culture that shapes the public’s worldview 
(Robertson, 2018).  
In emerging democracies, to what extent does media influence politics and 
democracy? This paper, an evaluation of media effect on an evolving, consolidating 
democracy sought to analyse the impact, if any, of media power in Nigeria- a non-
Western, post-colonial, unindustrialized nascent democracy in sub-Sahara Africa with a 
history of authoritarian rule (colonial and military), complex ethnoreligious polarisation 
and weak public institutions. Has media power shaped election results and regime 
outcomes since a new political dispensation took-off in 1999? That year, Nigeria 
transformed from authoritarian rule into a democracy. Now two decades old, politics is 
characterised by multiparty, regular and periodic voting. With seven presidential 
elections and steady transfer of political power, democracy is consolidating. Civil society, 
opposition groups and the media operate with constitutionally-guaranteed freedoms. 
News organisations are more economically viable, more independent and more assertive. 
In 2011, Oso (2011) observed that no news business of influence in Nigeria is owned or 
tied directly to the apron strings of a political party. This independence, coupled with its 
agenda-setting force, Oso added, have allowed the media break free from partisan 
political reporting and hold political office holders accountable as they did during 
decades of post-independent authoritarian regimes and a century of British imperial 
influence.  
However, the effect of media power on national politics since democratisation in 
1999 is a subject of much controversy. On one hand, Adesoji (2010) asserts that politics in 
Nigeria is largely shaped by media power through public opinion, press agitation and 
media agenda. Consequently, the press, perceived as powerful is often owned, recruited 
and/or engaged by politicians and political parties to influence public attitude and win 
elections. According to Kukah (2012), continued proliferation of new titles (print and 
online) particularly in Lagos and Abuja since 1999 is proof that media agenda-setting still 
plays a key role in contemporary Nigerian politics. Kukah argued further that media 
ownership by politicians and regional coalitions is an enduring feature- one that dates 





independent, detached from partisan politics and well-positioned to sway voting 
patterns and shape regime outcomes.  
On the other hand, media influence on Nigerian politics is increasingly questioned 
amidst worsening political corruption, state inefficiency and radical insurgency. News 
production is moulded by political and commercial pressure which complicates and 
often compromises the media’s ability to fulfil its constitutional role (Jatula, 2017). 
According to the British Broadcasting Corporation: “The (Nigerian) media has long been 
accused of being beholden to special interest groups, often placing financial interests 
above public interest in setting editorial priorities. Politicians and commercial advertisers 
hold great sway in decisions on story selection and publication…” (BBC Report, 2019). 
Public distrust of the media, accentuated by fake news, social media propaganda and 
deliberate disinformation have also eroded trustworthiness to the extent that the public 
no longer trust the press. A study by Madrid-Morales & Wasserman (2019) found that 93 
per cent Nigerians believe they are regularly exposed to fake news and are likely to trust 
the media less. The authors indicated that social media in Africa’s largest democracy is 
not empowering people to make sound political decisions; rather, it is decreasing public 
ability to make good judgements. 
  This paper- an evaluation of media power and its effect on Nigeria's consolidating 
democracy seeks to reconcile opposing yet divergent views about media influence on 
politics using the lenses of media effects. Does democracy in Africa depend on press 
freedom? Is media influence powerful, limited or negotiated? An investigation of press 
and politics nexus is fascinating yet complex; particularly in a system in which politics 
has not always depended on persuasion, openness, media freedom and public 
participation but on military fiat and centralised control. It is hoped that an analysis of 
ongoing struggle for power in oil-rich Nigeria- its concentration and use by a privileged 
few on one hand and on the other hand, media pressure to redistribute power, 
democratise decision making and restructure resource control especially in a large, multi-
ethnic and dynamic Nigeria will provide insightful understanding of media 
transformations and political reorganisation in post-colonial Africa. 
 
Theoretical framework: Media Agenda-Setting 
The normative theory of the press asserts that the media performs symbiotic roles of 
mediating between the state and the governed. The press it is argued contribute to 
democracy and good governance by surveying the political landscape, acting as 
watchdogs of political actors, providing forums for political debate, articulating public 
opinion and setting policy agenda (Keane, 1991). This cardinal idea is premised on the 
media’s supposed ability to influence public opinion and by extension democracy. It is 
believed that the press is able to raise the importance of an issue in the public space and 
among policy makers. The media may not directly tell the public what to think, rather, 





and analysis; the public is made aware of the importance attached to issues of public 
relevance (Graber, 2003). Although the public is able to determine issues it deems 
relevant, media analysis raises the salience of issues in the public domain.  
The link between media agenda, public agenda and politics was sketched in the 
Chapel Hill study by McCombs and Shaw (1968). Voters in the United States presidential 
election were asked to name the most important issue of the day and their responses 
closely reflected the patterns of news coverage during the preceding six months of media 
coverage exposed to them. The agenda of a news organization is discerned in its pattern 
of coverage of public issues over a period of time. Public attention is drawn to issues 
emphasized in the media. The correlation between media agenda and the public 
discourse is such that the former influences the latter (McCombs 1991). Through agenda-
setting, news organizations shape public understanding and perspectives on issues.  
Media agenda-setting is a two-tracked lane and can be problematic for democracy. 
The selection and omission process involved in determining news content and setting 
media agenda can unduly influence the electoral process. In 1988, Chomsky argued that 
through propaganda, mainstream news in the United States is used to manufacture 
consent, sway public opinion, affect election results and influence political decisions. 
Outside the United States, Herman & McChesney (2009) have described the dominant 
news media as largely composed of international conglomerates from Europe and North 
America that use concentrated advertising-based commercial interest to perpetuate 
Western media imperialism through technology, massification and free trade 
agreements. This allows them dominate control of information flow between the 
industrialized North and the underdeveloped South. These dominant corporations 
according to Ostgaard (1965) along with their narratives treat the culture of the industrial 
nations as superior and place them at the top of their hierarchy. In Western media 
narratives, Africa is routinely portrayed in negative terms; “… perennially problematic, 
unworthy, deplorable… without saying much about Africa’s strategic importance to 
industrial economies” (Ostgaard, 1965: 12). Africa in mainstream Western media 
narrative is depicted by extremes of hunger, famine, poverty, disease, war and political 
instability (Okigbo, 2001). These concerns highlighted in critical scholarship were central 
to the MacBride Report (1980), commissioned by UNESCO for the study of 
communications problems.  
The MacBride Report recommended a new world information and 
communication order that advocated for democratisation of global information flow and 
strengthening of national media to reduce dependence of external, neo-liberal forces. 
Although the United States and United Kingdom disagreed with UNESCO’s report and 
subsequently withdrew their membership; the power of the media in changing politics 
and society, globally and locally was never in question. More specific to media and 
democratisation in Africa, a free and independent press was conceptualised as an 





democracy across the continent (Windhoek Declaration, 1991). As observed by Randal 
(1993), the long history of media agitation in Africa and their close association with 
movements for national independence, particularly during colonialism demonstrated the 
political power of the press as a great mobilising force. The newly emergent political class 
in post-independent Africa, in a bid to consolidate their hold on power grew intolerant 
of press criticism to the extent that legal, economic and violent, police force was employed 
to supress and control the media. Despite direct political constraints, the press survived 
as the voice of the voiceless, a force opposed to authoritarian rule and a window through 
which the world saw, first hand, the sheer brutality and undemocratic state of politics in 
Africa. Foreign media organisations- BBC, VOA and others also provided incentives for 
democratisation both politically and otherwise. In less direct forms, they revealed 
through entertainment a life of freedom available in the West, a view of the outside world. 
As a consequence, they created expectations in Africa, of a good life, making hardship 
less acceptable. Politically, they provided a model for investigative news reporting, 
generated alternative news content that negated controlled information from within; and 
sowed ideological seeds that fuelled agitation for liberation movements in many parts of 
the continent. In sum, the press, both local and global, contributed significantly to the 
democratic process in Africa. 
 
Agenda-Setting in Nigerian Politics 
Media agenda in Nigeria unfolded in three phases- pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial eras. In the first phase, missionary newspapers such as Iwe Irohin fun awon Egba- 
Nigeria's first newspaper became the platform through which locals expressed their 
displeasure with Britain’s imperial influence. Originally established to proselytise 
natives, Iwe Irohin soon became embroiled in local politics and often incurred the wrath 
of Crown representatives (Omu, 1976). The paper along with other missionary 
newsprints were caught in the web of shifting political undercurrents that witnessed 
increasing Europe-based humanitarian, anti-slavery, evangelical work that spread 
beyond the coast of West Africa. It was a period of expanding British political influence 
and power (Ade Ajayi, 1965). As trade in African slaves across the Atlantic gave way to 
trade in commodities, extensive competition among chartered European companies 
ensued. Each scrambled to secure trade monopoly and/or lay claim to vast territories 
across Africa. Inevitably, Britain exerted increasing political and economic control over 
territories in the Niger area that became recognised at the Berlin Conference of 1888 
(Hopkins, 1975; Afigbo, 2006). Pre-colonial missionary newspapers, though limited in 
quality, circulation and lifespan, opened the door for a press agenda that criticised 
Britain’s takeover of Nigeria. 
At the dawn of British rule in 1900, media opposition became more assertive and 
widespread. Colonial rule necessitated, not only political control but also economic 





administrative mergers. Around 1914, a new generation of newspapers emerged with a 
more aggressive and confrontational agenda. These papers were owned and edited by 
educated and aggrieved Nigerians; discontent with colonial politics and Britain’s 
domineering powers (Omu, 1976). Colonial-era newspapers were radical and anti-
imperial. They called for social reforms and challenged inequality. Papers like- Lagos 
Daily News owned and edited by Herbert Macaulay, West African Pilot- Nnamdi Azikwe 
and Nigerian Tribune- Obafemi Awolowo- progressively played critical roles in 
clamouring for abolition of unfair taxes and minority rule. They galvanised public 
opinion, influenced constitution making, pressured Royal authorities in London and 
called for decentralised decision making. Media agenda, especially in the 1950’s shifted 
towards decolonisation, self-rule and later independence (Sklar 1963).  
After independence in 1960, media agenda transformed into support for national 
progress, economic development and self-sustenance (Ikime, 1980). Good governance 
was central to these transformations and the media engaged in development journalism, 
characterised by promoting state initiatives and providing a platform through which 
government plans, policies and dialogue would fester. However, in the late-60s, an 
adversarial press would emerge as military rule became entrenched. Constitutional crisis 
in Western region, partisan politics at the Federal government and tensions between 
Nigeria’s major ethnic groups brought to an abrupt end, Nigeria's First Republic (1960-
1965). Military rule from 1965 curtailed party politics, elections and press freedom. The 
outbreak of Nigeria/Biafra War (1967-70) ended in more military rule to the extent that 
Nigeria’s Second (1979-1983) and Third Republics (1993) were both hijacked and short-
lived. The press changed into outspoken critics of military rule. By the 1990s, the press 
had become a formidable influence on national politics. They set political agenda, shaped 
public debate and influenced popular opinion. Newspapers across Nigeria were united 
against military rule and everything the military stood for- human rights abuses, media 
suppression, political dictatorship, and superimposed decrees. And in spite of legal, 
economic, political and physical suppression that included detentions, imprisonments 
and proscriptions of news publications and media organisations; the press remained 
undaunted and irrepressible (Siollun, 2013). By 1999, local and international pressure 
brought military rule to its knees; transforming Africa's most populous nation into a 
democracy.  Twenty years on, what political influence does the press exert? 
 
Methodology 
To investigate media power on Nigerian politics, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with media professionals to gather data for the study. Three reasons justified 
this method: one, needed qualitative data is easy to collate from frontline news 
professionals. Two, interviews in general are faster and flexible to arrange and conduct, 
compared to focused group discussions or participant observation. Data generated 





interview facilitators have control over the order of questions, and can judge the 
spontaneity of respondents. The interviewer can also judge non-verbal actions and/or in-
actions; and if required, follow up with clarifying questions or comments (Newton, 2014). 
In total, 18 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Lagos (South) and Abuja 
(North). Each participant was personally contacted both by email and a follow-up phone 
call to ascertain their willingness and readiness to participate in the study. This 
notwithstanding; some participants declined after initial consent. While presenting the 
purpose of research, participants were reassured of absolute confidentiality and this 
stimulated robust commentaries. Participants included: news reporters (9), editors (2), 
and senior correspondents (7). They were all into political reporting. Some participants 
were randomly selected through articles they had published while others were randomly 
selected. The rationale behind assembling a varied cohort of participants was to gather 
as much perspectives as is possible from a wide range of media professionals from 
diverse religious, ethnic and social backgrounds; cut across different news organisations 
in Lagos and Abuja. The newspapers included Daily Trust (Abuja), Blueprint (Abuja) 
Tribune (Ibadan), Punch, Guardian and This Day in Lagos. Each interview lasted more than 
half an hour. Opened-ended questions were used during each interview. All interviews 
sessions were recorded and transcribed accordingly. Transcripts were analysed following 
a systematic process which required familiarity with the content of the transcripts before 
coding sections of text into meaningful units. These were then developed into broader 
thematic categories.  
The use of News-Game was employed as a research tool to elicit comments from 
participants. According to Kitzinger (1994), News Game is a useful way to engage 
focused group discussants and focused interview participants using newspaper cutting 
and media images to draw out comments. Although partakers did not engage in writing 
alternative news pieces as recommended by Kitzinger, they were vocal and engaged 
when newspaper cutting were used during interview. It should however be noted that 
interviewee quotes are presented in several different ways throughout this paper without 
reference to personal details or private identity. All participants, for fear of reprisal or 
backlash agreed to be interviewed only on condition of anonymity. Thus, general 
descriptions, including job title, location of organisation and in some cases, employer’s 
name are only disclosed. 
 
Findings and discussion 
Nigeria was centre stage of profound political, legal and social changes in the 1990s 
following decades of military rule. Democracy was restored in 1999 and with it came 
media liberalisation and constitutional reforms of sizeable proportions. It was hoped that 
these changes, particularly press freedom will transform the political space into a more 
open democratic system required for economic progress and human development. Two 





prebendal politics of a few, by a few have faded to the extent that media power is yet to 
reform the system. Evidence points up three factors- media polarisation, 
commercialisation and public resignation. Together, they combine to perpetuate the 
development of underdevelopment in democratic Nigeria.  
   
Media polarisation 
Traditional media- Overwhelmingly, interview participants stressed the dominance of 
news organisations in Lagos and Ibadan as the main conduit pipe of information in 
Nigeria. According to an Abuja-based reporter with Blueprint newspaper, “The Nigerian 
press, in reality is the powerful, privately-owned Lagos/Ibadan press. When they speak, 
the world listen. They are the window through which news and politics about Nigeria is 
view globally.” Multiple reasons account for this. Early political activities and 
concentration of newspapers in Lagos was influenced by access to an educated 
workforce, advertising revenue and economics of scale. This view reads Lagos and the 
South as ‘micro-Nigeria’ due in part to economic viability. Money and power, it is 
suggested, operate from this locus so it would be no more than sensible business practice 
to set up a national news outfits in Lagos or elsewhere in the south. It is therefore fit to 
situate post-1999 media developments within the global capitalist economic structure of 
modern Nigeria and argue that news business, first and foremost are private business 
concerns who primarily want to make profit and Lagos provides that platform. 
Journalists based in Abuja (Northern Nigeria) however believe that media outfits 
in Lagos and Ibadan, regarded as the Lagos/Ibadan press axis often represent the political 
views of the Yoruba ethnic group in southwest Nigeria. A DailyTrust newspaper reporter 
in Abuja noted that “It is difficult, if not impossible to divorce the culture of a geography 
from the character of its press and politics. Culture, politics and the media are all 
intertwined in southern Nigeria. The Lagos media is therefore not fully representative of 
all Nigerians” If this comment is exact, it therefore suggests that news platforms in the 
South have an inherently southern nature, radical in character and Christian by faith; an 
ideological standpoint that conflicts with the North’s conservative political and religious 
structure. Another reporter from Abuja added that “News content from Lagos-based 
organisations is an offshoot of the Yoruba conventional culture of criticism, a pronounced 
history of political struggle and a traditionally radical political system of opposition to 
oppressive rulers.” He stressed that this critical root was further influenced by Christian 
Enlightenment ideas. In the above narrative, the Lagos press is therefore routinely 
dismissed by the Muslim North as Western-Christian-Yoruba conspiracy, committed to 
a secular and liberal-radical order which opposes the conservative-religious political elite 
from the North. The radical ideology inherent in the South and its politics sets huge 
expectations on Lagos-based news platforms who in turn frame their content to satisfy 





accepted framework of the southern readers which mainly consist of south-western 
worldview. 
The issue of Yoruba philosophy and political influence as a dominant stimulus in 
southern newspapers are here bolstered by a story about the radical and dominant 
qualities of the southwest.  As indicated by a Lagos-based Punch newspaper editor: “The 
ideological perspective of the Southern elite has become the main framework for moral 
reference for news in Nigeria and that this perspective has deep historical roots.” A 
remarkable twist of irony suggests that the traditional political legacy of pre-colonial 
Yoruba societies provides the ‘educated’ South with a richer range of resources than the 
ethnically-conservative North. The comments therefore indicate a conflict of interest 
between the West-oriented, radical South and a traditionalist Muslim North with 
interlocking religious and political interest in Nigeria. Importantly, the narrative 
indicates continued dominance of the southern media in setting national media agenda 
and by extension, controlling national political discourse. It appears that the southern 
press claims to have a monopoly of understanding of Nigerian politics and national 
interest than other constituent parts. This creates ground for misinformation and 
misunderstanding within the polity. This prevailing narrative seeds resistance through 
its marginalizing of the northern part of the Nigeria.  We shall need in this analysis to 
consider whether the North is silenced– or, more disturbing, misrepresented in the 
central narrative.  
Is news bias against the North? Interview commentaries indicated that a reasonable 
degree of bias against the north exists in Lagos papers. A Lagos-based reporter with 
Guardian noted that, “the North is not sufficiently reported in the news. When it is, a third 
of the coverage is dominated by negative news of violence, illiteracy, disaster and 
poverty, especially ethno-religious conflicts related to Boko Haram.” Another Lagos 
reporter with This Day added that “bad news about Hausas’ is good news in the Lagos 
press”. If these commentaries are accurate, they indicate that news reportage from the 
South devoted to North is not only biased but significantly lower in quantity. The North, 
according to a journalist in Abuja is framed as violent, turbulent and volatile. These 
comments suggest that the north is subtly reported as incompatible with investment and 
progressive politics. As observed by a Daily Trust editor, it is difficult to quantify both the 
direct and less obvious linkages between negative reportage of Northern Nigeria and the 
perception and concentration of poverty in the region, however, media stereotypes in the 
description and analysis of the North, mainly within the press in Lagos may have 
contributed to the dearth of investment in the region. According to an editor with Tribune 
in Ibadan, though owners of the press in Lagos are not necessarily Yoruba; their 
operational location and rhetoric is ideologically southwest. Lagos-based news platforms 
therefore function to advance southern elite interests; as a result, their perspectives 






The described imbalance in coverage between the North and South and how the press in 
Lagos dominates national discourse is symptomatic of a deeper tension. The study found 
that Nigeria's multi-ethnic suspicion in the Middle-Belt region where both north and 
south meet; resource control controversies and appointments into federal offices which 
manifest in allegiance to ethnic groups; inter-ethnic antagonism; and hostility towards 
other groups are drummed up by a section of the press. In placing regional interest above 
balanced news coverage, the press in the north and south whip up political sentiments 
by giving prominence to politicians with sectional interest, particularly those who use 
ethnicity as a political leverage during elections. It is therefore no coincidence that in spite 
of dwindling circulation and revenue, new titles continue to proliferate in Lagos and 
Abuja. A Tribune newspaper political correspondent based in the North noted that 
“shortages in terms of resources, technology and manpower to adequately gather and 
report news in and about the North may also contribute to stereotypes and biased 
reporting in both hubs”. He added that media owners influence their news titles to 
support certain candidates during elections. As a consequence, news reports in general 
may not always be representative or prejudice-free.   
Although no newspaper is tied to the apron string of a political party, most dailies 
are used by regional political elites through advertisement for power contestation. 
According to a Guardian newspaper editor in Lagos, “Who owns what determines how 
and what is reported, what is left out and how what is included is framed and covered. 
Like they say, the fruit does not fall far from its tree.” He said further that, “Take Tribune, 
Punch and Vanguard for example, they are as regional in their outlook as DailyTrust and 
Blue Print.” An editor with DailyTrust, Abuja said, “…negative comments about the north 
in southern newspapers blames the north and its leadership for Nigeria’s woes; 
describing Hausa/Fulani leaders as wasteful and corrupt. This is not professionalism.” 
Counterclaims are made by reporters from the south. A ThisDay reporter in Lagos noted 
that, “newspapers in the North constitute an editorial and agenda-setting alliance too”.  
The assumption above is that newspapers in Nigeria are either for or against a region or 
political party- evidence does not support this. A closer analysis indicated that on certain 
issues, newspapers within Lagos diverged and disagreed. For instance, although Lagos-
based papers display similar characteristics (though in less significant ways), there is 
clear distinctions between and among them by reason of owner’s priorities and political 
ideology. It is also naïve to suggest that political allegiance in any region in united and 
similar. The above conflicting trajectories lends support to the view that newspapers in 
each region (North or South) are editorially aligned. What is, however, not clear is the 
degree to which these newspapers editorially align. While there are instances where the 
agenda of a paper is not consistent with that of its region, reporters indicated that it is 





New Media- Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, YouTube and Instagram as well as local 
blogsites- LindaIkeji, Jumia.com and BellaNaija have opened up information flow, 
political participation and collective engagement in Nigeria. Online news now plays a 
more significant role in breaking news. Participants noted that as far back as 2012, two 
major Twitter movements translated into real political action across Nigeria. 
#OccupyNigeria- an online protest against the removal of oil subsidy that quickly gather 
momentum offline, leading to violent demonstrations across major cities. And 
#BringBackOurGirls- another Twitter plea to rescue over 250 kidnapped school girls by 
Boko Haram- a radical Islamist group operating in Northeast Nigeria. This latter 
movement gained international attention as far as the United States, United Kingdom 
and Europe. Participants added that more recently, social media was instrumental prior 
to, during and after elections in 2015 and 2019. According to a Punch newspaper editor in 
Lagos, “All major political parties and politicians were well-represented on Facebook and 
Twitter.” With a population of over 190 million, 100 million of which are said to be active 
internet users; migration of political discourse online has never been more evident. 
According to a Lagos-based journalist, social media offers users, mostly young, urban 
dwellers with stable internet network; freedom to participate in political conversations 
and access information, especially breaking news from multiple blog sites and online 
communities both mainstream and alternative. A Blueprint reporter in Abuja said, 
amateur videos of political violence on Facebook and Instagram were acted upon by the 
police, leading to arrests.  
Most participants however asserted that, just as politics have moved online; so has 
ethnic sentiments and political propaganda. Social media news content is not only 
suspicious but also dubious. An Abuja editor with Blueprint observed that, “…during the 
recent 2019 presidential elections, social media served as an echo chamber through which 
disinformation or misinformation were posted, shared and retweeted.” In certain cases, 
ethnic bias was spread by seemingly credible sources and shared by unsuspecting 
audiences. For example, “it was reported on Twitter that Peter Obi, former governor of 
Imo state in the south deported northerners from the Owerri- the state capital while he 
was incumbent governor. Although untrue, this gained plenty of traction online in the 
build up to 2019 election where Peter Obi contested as Vice Presidential candidate on the 
People’s Democratic Party ticket.”  A Lagos editor added that, “Yoruba’s were reported 
to be burning Igbo shops in Lagos. These lie was a calculated attempt to incite ethnic 
tensions among Nigeria’s major regional groups.” A Guardian newspaper editor in Lagos 
noted that the platform may have changed; the conversation remains the same- ethnic 
rivalry and regional suspicion. She added that “Although the medium is neutral, they are 
being used for political antagonism, bitter political fights and suspicious information.” A 
correspondence in Tribune newspaper, Ibadan pointed out that the immediacy of sharing 
information without verification and filter also takes away from social media news 





social media news however, on the other hand, some form of gatekeeping, that sets apart 
traditional news platforms would radically increase news credibility online”. Multiple 
instances of falsehood and lies on social media is a cause of public concern.  
In sum, media agenda on social media is useful but incoherent, instant but 
conflicting and pervasive, yet unfiltered. It is a space beset with multiple voices, multiple 
agenda and multiple allegiances. As observed by an Abuja editor with DailyTrust, “It is 
increasingly difficult for the public to trust media-entrepreneurs, most of whom are one-
man businesses, operating in small spaces. The point of distrust is that these bloggers and 
online influencers are very susceptible to external funding particularly from politicians 
and political parties who readily offer cash or endorsements for favourable media 
content”. While this is true in some cases, broad generalisations are inaccurate. According 
to a Punch reporter, “…unlike traditional organisations with history and reputation; most 
bloggers are small-scale businesses with little media ethics or background in journalism. 
It is therefore the case that these low-stake media owners are rumour mills, publicists and 
propagandists who churn out favourable information for advertisers and sponsors”. 
 
Nigeria’s commercial press 
The pursuit of commercial success has had a negative effect on the media in general. In 
the Nigeria context, commercialisation has created public distrust. As observed by a 
Punch reporter in Lagos, “most readers often tell me that they don’t know what to believe 
between news on social media or in traditional media because both are rigged!” A 
reporter with Tribune in Ibadan observed that, "In Nigeria, truth is scarce in the press. In 
theory, the press is free but in practice, advertising money drives news content to the 
extent that views of advertisers and well-resourced individuals are generously express in 
the media.” This model of journalism is not exclusive to Nigeria. The neo-liberal 
philosophy is well established in Europe and America but does not necessarily inhibit 
most news organisations. Its uniqueness in Nigeria is that in trying to raise revenue, 
many news organisations now devote more pages to advertisement, rather than critical 
reporting. This has led a systematic repression of investigative news reporting and news 
with minimum economic value- according to a Daily Trust reporter. The picture that have 
emerged in the last two decades indicate that commercialisation is the driving force 
behind news coverage. This is most prominent during elections when media houses 
practically sell out to the highest bidder without recourse to ideological leanings. 
According to a Lagos-based reporter with Guardian newspaper, “I know of a Lagos-based 
paper that you literately can get anything published as news so long as you can pay for 
it.” An Abuja reporter added, "my former boss was very close to Abuja (national 
government). It is an open secret in the office that we are staunch defender of the 






Two decades ago, Oso (2002) raised concerns over the influence of news 
commercialisation, arguing that neither ethnicity nor geography is as influential as 
revenue. Using Oso’s newspaper cutting as new-game, a significant number of 
participants agreed that as more and more media organisations "sell" news, only certain 
views will dominate the press. And when deliberately-sponsored information is 
presented as news to broad and unsuspecting audiences, fake news results in 
misinformation and propaganda, capable to twisting political perception. This, according 
to an Abuja editor with Blueprint “is not unconnected to what owners want (revenue) as 
the practice of "cash for coverage" trickles down to every aspect of the news business. 
According to the editor, "there is a fine balance between objectivity and subjectivity in 
news reporting. If the scale tilts towards the latter, a media organisation will lose its 
credibility. If it tilts towards the former, many fear that the organisation may go under 
like Next newspaper.” Most, if not all newspaper of note in Lagos and Abuja are in private 
hands. In these companies, advertising revenue from politically-motivated content takes 
precedence over balance, fairness and professionalism in the media.  
 
Media effect on elections and regime outcomes 
In addition to ethnic bias, online propaganda and commercialisation; two other factors 
limit their influence of the media on politics. First, a significantly low percentage of 
Nigerians have limited access to news from multiple sources. As noted by a Tribune editor 
in Ibadan, “Nigeria’s voting public is influenced, not by press reports but by religious 
leaders and local politicians”. According to an Abuja editor, "in a country where close to 
half its total population are illiterate, rural dwellers; media power is mainly limited to 
literate, urban residents." He added that "there are still some communities in modern day 
Nigeria that have little or limited access to daily newspapers, constant electricity and 
stable internet connection, if any. How will these people make informed political 
decisions without news?" An editor with ThisDay in Lagos, citing a 2017 UNDP report in 
which over 35 percent of Nigerians are said to be illiterate; said “illiteracy is one of the 
most fundamental reason for underdevelopment in Africa in general and Nigeria 
especially. She noted, “it is shameful that in the 21st century, Nigeria has over a third of 
its people, about 60 million citizens unable to read and write! How effective is media 
agenda in a nation with 60 million illiterate citizens? It is even more annoying to know 
that the authorities at different levels of government are not doing enough to address the 
situation”. There is a regional dynamic to this. In comparing the north and south, an 
Abuja reporter with DailyTrust observed that news penetration is deeper and faster in the 
south than in the north due to higher levels of education in the former. "In the north, 
people vote based on religion and ethnic considerations. A typical Hausa/Fulani will not 
vote for a non-Muslim. And generally in the north, southern politicians are treated with 





voting patterns during national elections since 1960, evidence supports the above claim. 
An Abuja-based editor asserted that an average voter in the North will always vote his 
own. He said: "Similar to previous national elections, in 2015 and 2019 elections, 
northerners overwhelmingly voted for Mohammed Buhari, a Muslim from the north."   
Second, Nigeria’s elite culture, a legacy of colonial and military rule perpetuates a 
system that insulates political leaders from media criticism and public outcry. It has been 
suggested by Campbell (2019) that these elite class have perfect a scheme through which 
radical media organisations and vocal journalists are censored, discredited or controlled. 
Bottom-up political change is rare and is often resisted with judicial instruments and state 
security forces who crush free speech, right to assembly and freedom to demonstrate. 
Recent high profile examples include the six-month incarceration of Sahara Reporters 
founder, Omoleye Sowore by state security services “charged with treason, money 
laundering and "cyberstalking" for allegedly sharing false and insulting information 
about President Buhari." (BBC, 2019). In 2015, Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the Indigenous 
People of Biafra (IPOB)- a pressure group was detained for two years on charges of inciting 
public unrest in eastern Nigeria.  
Equally worrisome is the decline of media freedom in Nigeria since 2015- an 
indication of deliberate state-sponsored attempt to further and arbitrarily silence the 
press. In 2015, a new legislation, an addition to existing draconian laws that date back to 
military rule, was passed into law. The Cybercrime Act, according to Reporters Without 
Border (2019) can be widely used to arrest and prosecute vocal journalists and bloggers 
in an arbitrary manner. The Act is another step in the autocratic direction; further leading 
to a decline in press freedom in Nigeria. The report further indicated that the current 
administration of Mohammad Buhari must do more to protect journalist. In 2019, officers 
of the Nigerian Army raided the premises of DailyTrust newspaper in Maiduguri, Lagos 
and Abuja over allegations that the newspaper published information that the 
administration deemed sensitive about its military offensive on Boko Haram and Islamic 
State’s West Africa. Most participants agreed that the incident was another example of 
using military and police officers to routinely gag the press. A Punch reporter added that 
government officials often restrict journalists particularly when the latter investigate or 
report corruption scandals, human rights abuse or executive privilege. The raid on Trust 
is seen as part of a wider pattern of clamping down media freedom in Nigeria. Other 
similar incidents include the arrest of Jones Abiri on charges of terrorism and Samuel 
Ogundipe of Premium Times for not disclosing the source of his news story. According to 
Campbell (2019), “DAAR Communications, owner of African Independent Television and 
RayPower FM radio had it license suspended indefinitely, allegedly for… the presence of 
hate speech and suspect information from social media.” These media raids, arbitrary 






The study also found little media effect on development initiative and policy formulation. 
Responding to questions on links between media reporting and state-efficiency, most 
reporters agreed that the Nigerian state operates in isolation with little or no regard for 
news reports and/or public opinion. An Abuja editor commented that, “in spite of 
incessant calls for reform of anti-corruption organisations, especially the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to make it truly independent and well-resourced, 
the Nigerian government have shown no interest in bringing about changes that will 
improve the system. Other participants cited other examples such as, closure of national 
borders in Lagos and Port Harcourt in 2019 without due consultation with all 
stakeholders. The current governments simply imposed its will without caution. Another 
example is the introduction of RUGA settlement- an initiative of the Federal Government 
to settle Hausa migrant pastoral families, herdsmen and cattle farmers in newly created, 
organised rural sites particularly in southern states. This created so much backlash that 
the government had to back down on its implementation- another policy failure due to 
top-down government decision making. Here again we see a glaring error in judgement 
of the state to engage with or at least listen to media reports and public sentiments. An 
Abuja reporter observed that, “Although the media will continue to voice concerns about 
these serious issues, the current government of President Mohammed Buhari seems 
unperturbed by media reporting”. According to a Trust editor "what we have in Nigeria 
is a dysfunctional country with misguided policies and priorities but every four years, 
particularly at election season, we manage to get it right politically. Thereafter, chaos is 
reproduced for another four years."   
 
Conclusion 
This paper, located within the context of democratization in Africa, situated Nigeria’s 
news media within the current political dispensation to investigate the effects, if any, of 
media power on Nigeria’s consolidating democracy. Specifically, it examined if media-
power shaped elections and regime outcomes. Using semi-structured interviews and 
News Game research tool, the study found that news commercialisation, unfiltered fake 
news on social media and Nigeria’s regionally-divided press have increased public 
distrust in the news media. In spite of what Adesoji described as media proliferation since 
1999, press influence is yet to transform Nigeria’s political landscape into a transparent 
and open system conducive for public engagement, collective decision making and 
national consensus. Particularly in the areas of elections and regime outcomes, Nigerian 
politics remains the exclusive preserve of a minority few who decide and use state 
resources and privileges to further personal gains. Beyond periodic elections, most of 
which are neither free nor fair, politics lacks democratic and decentralized decision 
making. Evidence also indicates that mass illiteracy and public resignation are exploited 
by the ruling elite to resist calls by the media for reform. More recently, media 





shown less sensitivity to news content and media reporting to the point that news neither 
holds government accountable nor shape elections and regime outcomes.  
 
Recommendation 
Democracy in advanced economies functions best when multiple factors are present- 
written constitution, an independent judiciary, separation of powers, rule of law, a free 
press and an informed and engaged citizenry. The press particularly plays a central role 
in reporting and exposing injustice, corruption and elite privilege- essential ingredients 
that makes politics bear fruits. In the Nigerian context, media agenda must remain 
focused on political reforms through investigative reporting and expose journalism. Neo-
liberalism and its emphasis on commercial success within the media is an unstoppable 
force, not only in the West but across vast territories influenced by American-style news 
media structure; however, the Fourth Estate in Nigeria must rediscover its founding 
mission- public service; must exert more pressure on the political class to respect due 
process, human rights and rule of law; and must live to uphold democracy.   
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